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Abstract—The global Electronic Health Record (EHR) market
is growing dramatically and has already hit $31.5 billion in
2018. To safeguard the security of EHR data and privacy of
patients, fine-grained information access and sharing mechanisms
are essential for EHR management. This paper proposes a
hybrid architecture of blockchain and edge nodes to facilitate
EHR management. In this architecture, we utilize attribute-based
multi-signature (ABMS) scheme to authenticate user’s signatures
without revealing the sensitive information and multi-authority
attribute-based encryption (ABE) scheme to encrypt EHR data
which is stored on the edge node. We develop the blockchain
module on Hyperledger Fabric platform and the ABMS module
on Hyperledger Ursa library. We measure the signing and
verifying time of the ABMS scheme under different settings, and
experiment with the authentication events and access activities
which are logged as transactions in blockchain.
Index Terms—Attribute-based Multi-Signature, Attribute-
based Encryption, Blockchain, Edge Node, Hyperledger Fabric,
Hyperledger Ursa.
I. INTRODUCTION
Electronic health records (EHR), although containing pri-
vate information for patient diagnosis and treatment, need
to be frequently shared among different participants, such
as healthcare providers, insurance companies, pharmacies,
and medical researchers [1]. Therefore, one big challenge
to EHR management is to gather, store and share personal
healthcare information without violating privacy or compro-
mising security. In the context of EHR data management,
although healthcare providers (termed data users), such as
doctors, nurses, phlebotomists, medical laboratory scientists,
pathologists, etc., need to authenticate the patients (termed
data owners), not all of them (for instance, medical laboratory
scientists) need to know patients’ identity. In addition, patients’
healthcare information need to be protected and the patients
would define access policy specifying who have the permission
to access what information.
To authenticate patients while guaranteeing anonymity, the
scheme of Attribute-based Signature (ABS) [2] can be a
potential solution. Using ABS, a signature signed with a
patient’s attributes is attested not to the identity of patient but
instead to the attributes possessed by patient. However, ABS
is not flexible to update the policy embedded in the signature
since it adopts a one-time signature generation process.
To secure EHRs while facilitating versatile access and
sharing among healthcare providers, the method of Attribute-
based Encryption (ABE) [3] can be a candidate solution. ABE
is a public-key encryption scheme that binds security directly
to EHRs and the participants who access it by enforcing
attribute-based access control. Instead of encrypting EHRs
for a specific data user, ABE allows encrypted EHRs to be
accessed by any user with proper attributes satisfying the
access policy.
Recently, the technology of Blockchain [4] has been pro-
posed as a solution for EHR management [5], [6], [7], [8].
In this context, a blockchain can be used as a tamper-proof
log to record both the authentication events on the patients
and the access activities of EHRs by the data users. However,
to maximize the capability of blockchain-based EHR man-
agement solutions, the following issues need to be addressed.
First, the privacy of patients and the security of their EHRs.
Due to the decentralized and transparent nature of blockchain,
any identity and sensitive information of the patients should
not be stored directly into blockchain transactions. Second, the
size of blocks in a blockchain. Typically, the size of blocks in
a blockchain is too limited to accommodate EHRs containing
images of X-ray, CT scans, and MRI, and videos of ultrasound.
This paper proposes the Attribute-based Multi-Signature
(ABMS) scheme to authenticate patients anonymously. The
paper also describes the adoption of ABE to secure EHRs
with policy-based access control. Both schemes are integrated
into a hybrid architecture of blockchain and edge computing to
facilitate EHR management. Specifically, authentication events
of patients and EHR access activities are recorded into the
blockchain, i.e., on-chain, for traceability and accountability.
In collaboration, edge nodes, which function as off-chain
storage, store ABE-encrypted EHR data, so that only eligible
data users satisfying the specific EHR access policies can
decrypt and access the EHR data.
We prototype the designed hybrid architecture by using the
Hyperledger Fabric [9] and the Hyperledger Ursa [10]. In
addition, the Access Control Lists (ACL) mechanism is used
to facilitate attribute-based access control of patient profiles.
Using the prototype, we conduct experiments to validate the
operations of the smart contracts and policy-based access
control. We also evaluate the performance of the signing and
verification of multiple signatures of ABMS and blockchain
transactions under different application settings.978-1-7281-1328-9/19/$31.00 c©2019 IEEE
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II. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we describe the hybrid blockchain-edge
architecture consisting of the multi-authority ABE and ABMS
schemes. By referring to Fig. 1, we define the following
entities that take part in the proposed architecture.
  
Patient
Smart Sensor
Upl
oad
 EH
R
Attribute-based Encryption
Edge Node
Previous Hash (Block i-1) Previous Hash (Block i)
Block #i Block #i+1
EHR Address & Log EHR Address & Log
....
Healthcare provider
Hyperledger Composer Fabric Blockchain
Attribute Authorities
Issue Keys Issue Keys
Request EHR
Download EHR
Sign ABMS 
Verify AB
MS 
Fig. 1: Proposed System Architecture.
• EHR data: EHR data is a piece of information owned by
a patient, and can be accessed by authorized healthcare
providers who have the access permission.
• Patient: A patient is the data owner of his/her EHR data,
who defines the access policy for the data users (e.g.,
healthcare providers).
• Healthcare provider: A healthcare provider (e.g., doctor
and nurse) is a data user who needs to access the EHR
data owned by patients. A healthcare provider actively
seeks access permissions from patients.
• Attribute: An attribute is a piece of information (e.g.,
driver’s license) that is associated with a participant.
• Attribute authority: An attribute authority is an entity who
manages attributes and issues key pairs to data owners
and data users.
• Smart sensor: A smart sensor is a device that collects
EHR data from the patients and sends it to the edge node.
Smart sensors include imaging equipment such as X-ray,
CT scan, MRI, and ultrasound.
• Edge node: An edge node is a computing and storage
device, which stores ABE-encrypted EHR data.
• Smart contracts and blockchain: Smart contracts take
patients’ signatures as input and return EHR addresses.
The blockchain serves as a tamper-proof log of patient
authentication events and EHR access activities.
A. Multi-authority CP-ABE mechanism design
This subsection describes the use of multi-authority CP-
ABE [11] in the context of EHR management.
Initial Setup(λ) −→ IP . The initial setup takes a security
parameter λ as the input and outputs the initial parameter IP
for the system.
Authority Setup(IP ,ATi ) −→ PKi, SKi. Authority i takes
the initial parameter IP and attribute ATi as the input to
generate the public key PKi and secret master key SKi.
Key Generation(ATi ,GID ,SKi , IP ) −→ Ki ,GID . This key
generation algorithm takes as inputs attribute ATi , the global
identification number GID of a data user, the secret master
key SKi, and the initial parameter IP , and returns the attribute
key Ki ,GID to the data user.
Encryption(IP ,M ,A, {PKi}) −→ CT . The encryption al-
gorithm takes as inputs the initial parameter IP , EHR data
M , access policy A defined by a patient, and the set of public
keys PKi. It outputs the ciphertext CT as the encrypted EHR
data. Moreover, the access policy A defines which healthcare
providers are allowed to access the EHR data of the patient.
Decryption (CT , IP , {Ki ,GID }) −→ M . The decryption
algorithm takes as inputs the initial parameter IP , ciphertext
CT , and a collection of attribute keys {Ki,GID }. It outputs
the EHR M if the set of attributes keys satisfies the access
policy for the ciphertext CT . Otherwise, the decryption fails.
B. Multi-authority ABMS mechanism design
By extending [12], [13], the model of multi-authority
ABMS is described as below:
Initial Setup(λ) −→ IP : The initial setup takes the security
parameter λ as input and outputs the initial parameters IP for
the system.
Authority Setup(IP ,ATi ) −→ SIKi ,VKi : Each attribute
authority executes the setup algorithm with the input of
the initial parameter IP and attribute ATi, and returns the
signature key SIKi and the verification key VKi for each
attribute ATi .
Extract(IP ,GID ,ATi ,SIKi ) −→ SKi ,GID : This algorithm
is executed by the attribute authorities. An attribute authority
takes as inputs the initial parameters IP , the owner’s unique
identity GID , the attribute ATi, and the authority’s signature
key SIKi. In the end, the algorithm returns the signing key
SKi ,GID .
Sign(H (Ai), IP ,SKi ,GID ) −→ σi: This algorithm is exe-
cuted n times based on the number of attributes belonging to
the data owner (patients). It takes as inputs the hashed attribute
value H (Ai), initial parameter IP , and signing key SKi ,GID ,
and outputs the signature σi.
Verify(H (Ai), IP , σi ,VKi ) −→ {0, 1}: This algorithm
takes as inputs the hashed attribute value H (Ai), the initial
parameter IP , the signature σi, and the verification key V Ki.
In the end, the algorithm outputs a Boolean value accept or
reject to indicate whether the signature from the data singer
(patient) with the specific attribute is valid or not without
revealing the signer’s identity.
In the proposed ABMS scheme, we applied the (t ,n)
threshold scheme, where 1 ≤ t ≤ n, to as shown in Fig. 2. For
instance, patient Annie signed three signatures related to her
patient ID issued by the hospital, her driver’s license issued by
DMV, and her insurance ID issued by the insurance company.
A medical laboratory scientist, who does test on Annie’s blood
work, will apply the threshold of 3 out of 3 to authenticate her,
while a medical research scientist will apply the threshold of
1 out of 3 to authenticate Annie to access her EHR for data
analysis. For both cases, the aim of ABMS is to authenticate
patients anonymously while using different thresholds.
V(H(A1), IP, V1, σ1) = True
.
.
.
V(H(A2), IP, V2, σ2) = True
V(H(A3), IP, V3, σ3) = True
V(H(An), IP, Vn, σn) = True
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ABS Signature σ2
ABS Signature σ3
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Fig. 2: Multi-signature threshold scheme.
C. On-chain and off-chain hybrid architecture
To overcome the space limitation issue [7], the transaction
privacy issues [14], [15], [16], and the issue of lacking proper
access control among participants [7], [17] of the blockchain,
we propose a hybrid architecture which consists of an on-
chain record of ABMS authentication events and EHR access
activities (including EHR addresses and other information) as
transactions on a blockchain, and an off-chain storage of ABE-
encrypted EHR data on the edge nodes, as shown in Fig. 3.
In addition, each patient saves his/her data, including GID ,
name, and ABMS signatures in a private profile. A patient
will define access policy for the data users (e.g., healthcare
providers) to access his/her profile, which is implemented with
the ACL mechanism of the Hyperledger Fabric blockchain.
Patient
EHR Data
ABS Signature
Encrypted Data Off-chain Edge Nodes
Encrypt   Store
  Store
  
Validate
Address & Log   On-chain Block
Fig. 3: Hybrid on-chain and off-chain architecture.
D. Workflow of EHR management
Workflow of EHR management is depicted in Fig. 4.
First, all the participants register themselves with the EHR
management system. Attribute authorities issue ABMS and
ABE keys to both patients and healthcare providers based
on their attributes. After being granted private keys from
multiple attribute authorities, a patient uploads his/her EHR
data, which is encrypted via ABE1, to the edge node. Next,
a patient signs his/her hashed attribute values to generate
the ABMS signatures, which are stored in his/her profile
in the EHR management system. When a data user (e.g., a
1In practice, it is not practical for patients to handle (e.g., encrypt) their
EHR data personally. To address this issue, smart sensors could be the entities
to receive these private keys to ABE-encrypt EHR data before uploading it
to the edge node.
healthcare provider) needs to access a patient’s EHR data, an
EHR access request is sent to the blockchain which triggers
ABMS signature verification to authenticate the patient. A
smart contract is executed to log the authentication event and
return a one-time EHR URL to the healthcare provider. After
that, the healthcare provider sends the one-time EHR URL to
the edge node to retrieve the encrypted EHR data.
  Edge NodeBlockchain   EHR Address & Access Log
Smart sensor collect EHR Data
Send EHR access request
Get EHR address
ABMS verification
ABE Encrypted
Get one-time EHR URL
Send one-time EHR URL
ABE Decrypted
Get encrypted EHR
  Authority setup & Key generation
 Key generation
Profile
Deploy smart contract
ABMS signing
Fig. 4: Workflow of Attribute-based Multi-Signature and En-
cryption for EHR management.
III. PROTOTYPE AND EVALUATION
A. Prototype
We prototyped the proposed EHR management system and
conducted a series of experiments to evaluate its performance.
The system consists of two primary modules that interact
seamlessly: the ABMS module and the blockchain module.
A.1 ABMS Module
ABMS performs the functionalities of key generation, and
signing and verification of attribute-based multi-signatures of
the patients. These functionalities are programmed by using
Hyperledger Ursa [10], a cryptographic library for blockchain-
based applications. Hyperledger Ursa is built on the Rust
language and provides APIs for various digital signature
schemes.
1) Phase 1 – Initialization: Phase 1 initializes the instances
of the participants which include multiple authorities, patients,
and doctors. The patient Annie Foster, for instance, has three
attributes, which are patient_id (value: 0003231) is-
sued by the hospital, driver_license (value: 9907184)
issued by the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), and
insurance_id (value: 1EG4-TE5-MK72) issued by her
health insurance company.
2) Phase 2 – Multi-Authority Key Generation: In Phase 2,
each attribute authority generates a key pair for each attribute
it issues. The BLS signature scheme [18] was used to build
the key-pair generator, which generates the signing key for
the data owner and the verification key for the data user, as
follows:
let generator = Generator::new().unwrap();
let sign_key = SignKey::new().unwrap();
let verify_key = VerKey::new(&generator,
&sign_key).unwrap();
3) Phase 3 – Signing ABMS Signatures by Data Owner:
In this phase, the data owners use the signing keys to sign
their hashed attribute values, and the resulting signatures are
saved in data owners’ profiles on the blockchain (Section IV-
A.2). Using the BLS signature scheme [18], each signature
consists of three elements on an elliptic curve. For instance,
as shown in Fig. 5, the hashed attribute value of 0003231
from patient_id was signed into a combination of three
points on an elliptic curve. Our experiments show that the
average running time for the signing phase is around 32 ms.
Fig. 5: Example of one ABMS signature.
4) Phase 4 – Verifying ABMS Signatures by Data User:
Eventually, a data user verifies each ABMS signature retrieved
from the blockchain (Section IV-A.2). The verification func-
tion takes a signature, a hashed attribute value, a verification
key and the corresponding generator as inputs, and utilizes
BLS bilinear pairing [19] to verify the signature:
let result = Bls::verify($signature,
patient_id.as_slice(),
$verify_key, $generator)
.unwrap();
In our experiments, the average running time for verifying
each signature is around 243 ms. After that, the data user
can authenticate the data owner anonymously by applying the
multi-signature threshold mechanism, where the number of
verified signatures is compared against the threshold.
A.2 Blockchain Module
The blockchain module is developed on the Hyper-
ledger Fabric and deployed and executed on the Hyper-
ledger Composer Playground [9]. The blockchain module
records patients’ profiles of GIDs, first and last names,
signed ABMS signatures, and one-time self-destructing url
addresses [20] for EHR data stored on the edge node. We use
https://1ty.me/ [20] to encode the addresses of EHR
data stored on the edge node. Once an 1ty.me address is
accessed, its url link becomes invalid and cannot be used to
access the same EHR data again.
To evaluate the access control mechanism between patients
and healthcare providers, we conducted the following experi-
ments. When a healthcare provider wants to access a specific
patients EHR data from the off-chain storage, he/she needs
to first authenticate the patient by verifying patient’s ABMS
signatures (Section IV-A.1(4)) against the threshold via a smart
contract. Upon executing the smart contract successfully, it
returns a one-time self-destructing url address of patients EHR
data stored in the edge node. At the same time, the blockchain
will record this access event as a transaction, which includes
the event ID and the timestamp as shown in Fig. 6.
Fig. 6: Result of executing the smart contract.
B. Performance Evaluation
To evaluate the performance of the ABMS module, we
conducted experiments to analyze the effect of varying the
length of attribute values as well as the number of attributes.
1) Varying the length of attributes: We increased the length
of attribute from 10 to 100, 1,000, and 10,000 characters,
and the results showed that both signing and verification time
are independent of the attribute length, and the time remains
around 32 ms and 243 ms, respectively, for each attribute.
Fig. 7: Run time of Ursa BLS vs. the number of attributes.
2) Varying the number of attributes: We also increased the
number of attributes of a patient from 1 to 3, 5, 7 and 9,
and measured the running time of the signature signing and
verification phases. The total running time showed a linear
growth with the increasing the number of attributes (Fig. 7).
Compared to the signing phase, the verification phase takes
more time because it requires computing two pairings on the
elliptic curve [18].
IV. SUMMARY
In this paper, we proposed a hybrid architecture of
blockchain and edge nodes, by utilizing the ABMS scheme to
authenticate user’s signatures without revealing sensitive infor-
mation and the ABE mechanism to encrypt EHR data which is
stored on the edge node. We developed the blockchain module
on Hyperledger Fabric platform and the ABMS module on
Hyperledger Ursa library. To evaluate the system performance,
we designed and conducted experiments for ABMS module.
For ABMS module, we measured the signing and verifying
time under different settings. For the blockchain module, we
experimented with the authentication events and access activ-
ities, which were logged as transactions in the Hyperledger
Fabric blockchain.
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